Article abstract
This article examines the origins, evolution, ideology, and political impact of an environmental coalition in the 1970s. Two wilderness activists in northwestern Ontario challenged established preservationist groups to shift their advocacy from public battles over management policy for individual parks, to design and promote a system of provincially-owned wilderness parks. To build public support and maximize their political clout, the two advocates persuaded five groups to form the Coalition For Wilderness (CFW) in 1973. Unfortunately CFW was mostly a two-man show. Constituent groups gave insufficient material support because of their diverse interests, economic woes, and the "free rider" problem. Nevertheless, CFW's tactic of privately lobbying park planners within the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources had some political impact. It generated policy information and educated the public about the need for a wilderness park system, thereby supporting the parallel efforts of the bureaucrats. Ironically, the coalition's scientific rationale for protecting wilderness limited its influence among planners and the wider advocacy community, both of whom regarded recreational and other reasons for wilderness protection as more politically defensible than science. This difficult episode taught the CFW leadership valuable lessons, enabling Ontario preservationists to build more successful coalitions in the 1980s and 1990s. D uring the late 1960s and early 1970s Canadian society was buffeted by intense gusts of popular concern over the environment. Air and water pollution, hydro-electric power projects, the proposed Mackenzie Valley Pipeline, and shrinking wilderness areas captured media attention, aided by a proliferation of public interest groups.
As historians Robert Page and Samuel P. Hays explained, environmentalism in post-war North America was part of the history of consumption, a product of economic development and material prosperity, rising educational levels, more leisure time, and surging interest in quality of life issues and amenities. 2 The popularization of scientific ecological con- In Ontario, environmental issues retained a high profile throughout the decade. Interest groups found a sympathetic ear in the opposition Liberal and New Democratic parties during ProgressiveConservative minority governments led by Premier William G. Davis (1975 Davis ( -1981 . Paradoxically, it was difficult for advocacy groups to sustain operations in this era of heightened environmental awareness. Competition for attention, money, and volunteer time was fierce because of the many groups and issues portrayed in the media, and because the Canadian economy was undergoing difficult restructuring. For pressure groups to survive, they had to be well-organized, with a stable membership base and steady financial support.
Envi ronment al Coal i t i ons and t he Li mi t s of Sci ence
Wilderness
Résumé: Dans cet article, nous examinerons les origines, l'évolution, l'idéologie et l'impact politique d'une coalition pour l'environnement dans les années 1970. Deux activistes dans le nord-ouest de l'Ontario défiaient les groupes voués à la conservation à mettre moins d'emphase sur les débats concernant la politique de gestion des parcs individuels et à se consacrer plutôt à la mise en place d'un système de parcs provinciaux. Afin de gagner le soutien de l'opinion publique et de maximiser leur poids politique, les deux défenseurs ont réussi à persuader cinq groupes à former la Coalition For
Another key to success in this era, suggested American political scientist Christopher Bosso, was the ability to adapt to political and organizational challenges. Successful groups identified and occupied specific "niches"-policy, tactical, or ideological-within the environmental movement. 4 Organizations lacking these attributes collapsed or were folded into more firmly established groups.
Another strategy for environmental groups was to construct a coalition of like-minded bodies. Such alliances could give the appearance of broad support, but they too required material resources and demanded consensus on tactics and ideology among diverse interests. In Ontario, two wilderness activists and scientific educators faced such challenges with mixed results when they constructed the Coalition For Wilderness (CFW) in 1973. Their efforts provide a perspective of the environmental movement as ideologically 3 The term "environmental advocacy community" is from Christopher J. wilderness advocacy in ontario fragmented, unevenly supported by the public, and chronically short of funds. Political scientists have studied coalition-building within social movements to determine why groups come together, and the importance of these bodies for public policy. 5 Much of the literature invokes "incentive theory": groups join together "when it is to their advantage concerning policy goals, organizational maintenance, or intergroup solidarity." Coalitions can "secure policy benefits, " provide access to "needed skills or expertise, " and allow "a group to share in the information that a larger network may possess." Over time, the perceived value of these incentives may diminish if the political context shifts. Individual organizations participate in coalitions "most often during periods of intense threat or favorable opportunities." As we shall see, the CFW was built to exploit an opportunity to plan a wilderness parks system for Ontario. Establishing a coalition and keeping it together is difficult work. A "variety of factors-attitudinal, cultural, and contextual"-may divide groups within a movement. Organizations may compete for attention, members and patrons. Moreover, "ideological cleavages" can threaten solidarity. 6 Each of these problems challenged Ontario's wilderness advocates during the 1970s. They often struggled for attention within an environmental movement that seemed to be expanding continuously with new issues and groups. Moreover, wilderness activists were divided on a fundamental question of ideology that undermined the integrity of their coalition from the beginning.
In its tactics, the CFW was a mix of change and continuity. It was the first attempt in Ontario (perhaps the second in Canada) to strike a formal alliance of wilderness preservationists. In the minds of the organizers, they "were proposing something entirely new." They were unaware that, some twenty years earlier, Americans had formed a powerful coalition to defeat plans to dam Echo Park within Dinosaur National Monument. Viewed from this pluralistic perspective, the CFW was only one of several interests pushing its own view of ecological planning in the development of wilderness policy. Its influence was limited within this complex synthesis. Ironically, the CFW's ideological niche-a scientific rationale for protecting wilderness, based on the "natural ecosystem" concept-limited the group's influence among planners and the wider advocacy community who regarded recreational and other reasons more politically potent. Thus, in contrast to the early work of Pollution Probe (established 1969), or the campaign against insecticide spraying in New Brunswick (1950s-70s), the CFW found science to be a major obstacle to popular support.
12 Wilderness advocacy in Quebec during the As Matthew Hatvany argued, professional ecologists and foresters provided scientific legitimacy for wilderness preservationists who opposed Hydro-Quebec's plans to dam the Jacques Cartier River in parc des Laurentides for power generation, a water reservoir, and tourism. The Quebec scientists who spoke out in public debate articulated not only scientific, but also aesthetic, philosophical, and democratic arguments to protect the wilderness. In contrast, the CFW in Ontario left such traditional, non-scientific arguments to the other Ontario groups, and emphasized the scientific rationale. This scientific vision of the wilderness was pivotal in the debate over preservationist strategy in both Canada and the United States.
13
Despite the coalition's weakness, Addison and Bates had a significant impact. They provided modest but welcome political support for park planners in their own struggle for Crown land against forestry and mining interests. The parties influenced each others' thinking on the science of systems planning. Moreover, the CFW performed like a classic pressure group by disseminating policy information, and educating provincial politicians and the public. It was a slight, democratic broadening of the planning process, contributing to citizen participation, and it increased public accountability.
14 After provincial authorities completed their own parks system blueprint in 1978, preservationists carefully monitored its implementation, forming new and much more effective coalitions for wilderness based on lessons learned in the early 1970s.
Roots of a Wilderness Concept
T he "ideological niche" of the CFW was to advocate the preservation of wilderness for its "intrinsic, " scientific value, based on the "natural ecosystem" concept.
15 Bill Addison and David Bates were part of an intellectual upheaval during the sixties and early seventies that associated wilderness with positive values. Changing socio-economic forces underlay this transformation. Dramatically increasing demand for recreation in "wild" areas clashed with accelerating natural resource extraction and land development. The popularization of scientific, ecological concepts provided a common language and conceptual framework for critiques of human industrial society that often celebrated the wilderness as a healthy opposite. 16 To Addison and Bates, wilderness was a natural and potent ideal, a worthy focus for advocacy in the public interest. Like the directors of Greenpeace Canada during the early 1970s, they shared a "professional managerial class" identity-characterized by salaried employment, and relatively high socio-economic status, educational levels and control over work processes-that led them to suggest policy. 17 But the roots of their wilderness ideal lay in personal experience, education and class, and regional influences from both southern Ontario and the "near north."
Addison's upper-middle class family inspired in him a respect and love for wild country, and a keen desire to explore and protect it. Addison's commitment to these values was strengthened by weekend visits to Algonquin Park and lengthy discussions during the daily car pool commute with Douglas Pimlott-a fellow Richmond Hill resident, graduate forester, wolf ecologist, professor of zoology and forestry at the University of Toronto, and eventual founder of the Algonquin Wildlands League. 22 Pimlott, also an advocate of ecological forestry, told Addison that senior provincial park staff of the DLF took a narrowly utilitarian approach to park management. Intent on maximizing an annual timber harvest, they failed to appreciate the need to preserve wilderness-conceived as a natural ecosystem 23 -for primitive-style recreation, and for its own sake. Pimlott invited Addison to join an informal group of university students who debated the meaning of wilderness to society. They embraced the natural ecosystem concept, defining wilderness as "a more or less self-regulatory ecological unit, where man's interference with the land…is minimal." 24 The natural ecosystem idea had evolved for decades, and was very much 20 Peter Addison was chief of the provincial parks branch in Toronto (1967-71 contested. During the 1950s, an "ecosystem paradigm" had flowered among plant ecologists, popularized by Eugene Odum's The Fundamentals of Ecology (1953) . By the early sixties, the contradictory impulse of allowing natural forces to function freely, while manipulating plant or animal communities in pursuit of a particular kind of landscape, was prominent in American national parks policy. 25 Thirty years later, scientists still had no consensus on what constituted "natural systems" or "natural communities." How to preserve such conditions, therefore, could not be prescribed by science alone. Humans had to make value judgments about what was "natural… desirable, and what ought to be preserved."
26 As geographer Thomas Vale argued, the "wilderness as ecosystem concept" was anthropocentric. Furthermore, he argued, when advocates spoke of protecting wild areas sufficiently large to secure complete ecosystems, they ignored the view of many biologists that such communities lacked "discrete boundaries." Ecosystems were "abstractions" to focus thinking on particular species or connections "between components of the natural world." Vale noted that the concept also fostered an "alarmist" notion that "the natural world is fragile and easily disrupted, even destroyed, by human activities."
27 Bill Addison was fully aware that ecosystems lacked clear boundaries. However, he also recognized that "parks, by definition must have boundaries as do zones within parks." While he was not an alarmist, he did believe the world was "fragile because humans had acquired the power and means to destroy" it.
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In political terms, the wilderness definition adopted by Addison and his peers was a rejection of the widely shared multiple-use concept-wilderness conservation-promoted by both the DLF and the Quetico Foundation (est. 1954), Ontario's first "watchdog over wilderness."
29 Multiple-use reconciled recreation, conservation of resources, and log- to have it reclassified as a "primitive" park-free of mechanized recreation and natural resource extraction. 34 In the fall of 1970, Bates-now a Thunder Bay resident, teaching science education at Lakehead University-met Bill Addison at a founding meeting of the local "Save Quetico Committee, " where they agreed to prepare a brief for the public hearings. (Figures 7-12) The Quetico brief swayed the Minister's Advisory Committee and became a cornerstone for CFW policy. 35 Addison and Bates tried to find the middle ground between a strict "hands off " policy and one of intensive management. But, for some northerners and southerners, the proposed bans on logging, sport hunting, camping in large numbers, and mechanized recreation would have been difficult to accept. 36 A suggestion to allow "Treaty Indians" continued use of registered traplines in Quetico, even with mechanized access, reflected the preservationists' grasp of local conditions and, from their non-Aboriginal perspective, a sense of social justice.
37 Such cultural sensitivity was uncommon among environmentalists at the time. Echoing American ecologists, 38 Addison and Bates recommended "controlled prescribed burning" to rejuvenate forests and declared pesticide spraying unacceptable-opposing "old-school" foresters who favoured fire and insect suppression. 39 Overall, the document was a subtle blend of apparently divergent impulses, typical of Canadian environmental discourse in the 34 Killan twentieth century. 40 It combined aspects of modernity-an optimistic drive to impose rational planning, scientific management, and marketing, through the use of the state-with "an 'anti-modern' sensibility"-a bourgeois dissatisfaction with urban, industrial life and the (nostalgic) search for meaning in primitive, authentic experiences.
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Pressure Group Plans T he decision to establish a new pressure group was a response to disagreements within the preservationist movement and the opportunity provided by government initiatives. In 1972 the intellectual paths taken by AWL directors in Toronto and the two advocates in Thunder Bay, began to diverge. Differences emerged over political strategy, tactics, and even the reasons for wilderness preservation. 42 Addison and Bates reached a tactical and strategic turning point by the spring of 1973. They resolved to avoid the AWL's tactics of open confrontation; instead, they would seek private meetings with sympathetic DLF staff. 43 Their emphasis on "the perceived rationality of science, " or "rational scientism, " facilitated a joining of the ecological perspective with the rise of the bureaucracy-two prominent trends in Canadian government. It was an effective way to achieve results, but it altered the democratic process: bypassing the politicians to reach the experts. 44 From the perspective of political science, the two preservationists began to function as policy brokers. They encouraged strategic thinking, beyond single parks, about a wilderness park system. 45 Park system planning had been discussed in the 45 They had found an unoccupied "policy niche;" Bosso, Environment, Inc., 49. The shift was partly a reaction to AWL director Bruce Litteljohn, who was advocating additional parks around the Black Bay peninsula in Lake Superior; Addison and Bates were more concerned about other unprotected areas.
international literature during the late 1950s and early 1960s. As historian John Lehr explained, this approach aimed "to achieve a balanced park system which represents major ecological zones, reconciles the demands of various recreational users and minimizes conflicts between recreational and resource use." Basic system plans were adopted by the national parks bureaucracies in Canada and the United States by the early seventies, while provincial planners in Manitoba and Ontario began preliminary work. 46 Two concurrent developments further inspired the preservationists to organize. First, the Ontario government began its Strategic Land Use Planning (SLUP) initiative, a bold new approach to resolve conflicts among competing users of Crown land. Addison and Bates welcomed this shift from "hotspot planning" toward a broader, regional approach. 47 Preservationists saw a second opportunity in April 1972 when Premier William Davis announced a reorganization of government, merging the DLF with Mines and Northern Affairs into a Ministry of Natural Resources. A new Division of Parks, led by preservationminded James W. ("Jim") Keenan, would continue to expand its planning efforts and produce "a clear, concise statement of policy." 48 Addison and Bates spent several months prior to April 1973 laying the foundations for a new pressure group. First, they refined their core views on wilderness parks and the kinds of areas to be protected. In 1972, AWL directors had proposed that the smallest dimension of a wilderness park should require "two days' travel by primitive means." Addison objected; he wrote that it was "important to define wilderness not in terms of recreational use, but in terms of ecological defensibility." To protect natural processes from external human influences, he argued, such parks had to be at least "400-600 square miles with a minimum dimension of 20 miles." 49 Second, while they debated philosophical and technical questions, they began organizational work to support their campaign for a wilderness parks system. These tasks were carried out in a spirited dialogue with other preservationists that masked a struggle for power and influence.
As the "point man" in Toronto with a wealth of contacts, schoolteacher and AWL veteran Bruce Litteljohn contributed significantly to the birth of the CFW. For example, he designed an effective political strategy. In late November 1972, he advised the northerners to seek co-operation from the major conservation organizations through a combined directors' meeting, and to obtain the "prior support of selected key people" like Douglas Pimlott. Litteljohn did much of this political spadework. Another important contribution was to initiate a review of the coalition's technical tasks, like setting priorities for selecting wilderness areas. Litteljohn upheld recreational potential, but added other criteria. 50 (Figures 13-14 This was a false dichotomy: scientific "intrinsic" values were imposed by subjective human judgement. But as a pressure group, the CFW needed resolve on a core belief. Addison and Bates mapped physiographic zones and forest regions to estimate "that 10 to 14 primitive parks" would suffice. Specific park sites would be selected based on recreational, cultural, and other values including biotic "uniqueness." (Figures 15 and 16) The project was very ambitious and enormously complex. Litteljohn lamented that they would be "doing the work of the Ministry"-without its team of civil servants! 52 Addison and Bates projected four elaborate stages over twenty-two months, culminating with provincial legwilderness park should be "no smaller than 400 square miles (e.g. 20 miles square) and should probably be at least 1,000 square miles, " although "ecological criteria may dictate much larger areas. islation. This strategy showed increased political sophistication, characteristic of a pressure group. Their strict views on the structure and financing of the proposed coalition must be seen in the same context. Environmental groups-including coalitions-can take many forms. They might differ in their leadership (professional or amateur), decision-making process (centralized or decentralized), degree of member engagement (from "checkbook members" to active participants), and advocacy tactics ("insider" lobbying or "outsider" protests with media attention). Each form has the potential to influence public policy, depending on political circumstances. 53 In the CFW, the leadership was amateur-Addison and Bates had university degrees in science, but were not paid for their coalition work. They envisioned a fairly centralized decision-making process, active engagement by committed leaders of the constituent groups, and the use of insider tactics. To ensure good communications (and to maintain centralized leadership), only two representatives of each charter group would be involved in drafting a wilderness parks plan. Each organization would have an equal vote, but only if it provided financial and/or service support. This was vital because Addison and Bates had already invested much of their own resources. 54 When the charter groups failed to provide sufficient material resources, the resulting lack of a formal structure for the coalition gave Addison and Bates a free hand to act on 53 Shaffer, "Coalition Work, " 116-122. 54 An unrealistically modest budget-a $3800 deficit, financed by member groups-suggested "that one 'bums, begs, steals or borrows' whatever he can." policy matters.
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The Action Plan achieved its immediate purpose, attracting support from five of the original seven groups contacted. All were impressed by the proposal. The Conservation Council of Ontario, although sympathetic to the ecological concept of wilderness, remained aloof. Likely because of the diversity of its own member groups and its dependence on their donations, the council was unable to commit to the coalition. A similar response came from the Canadian Wildlife Federation. Its director was enthusiastic, but the federation could not participate because of budget restrictions and because the group's provincial wing (the Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters) wanted sport hunting in wilderness parks. 56 On 26 April 1973, at the FON's conference, five organiza-55 A similar "structurelessness" was deliberately perpetuated during the 1970s by the leadership of Greenpeace Canada, enabling them to direct as they pleased, harming working-class interests. In the United States, "none of the environmental advocacy organizations" established during the late sixties and early seventies "made any pretense of giving dues-paying members… a voice in agendas, tactics, or governance." Harter, "Environmental Justice For Whom?" 90; Bosso, Environment, Inc., 52. The CFW leadership at least attempted to build a democratic structure. 56 tions-the Federation of Ontario Naturalists, Algonquin Wildlands League, Canadian Nature Federation, Sierra Club of Ontario, and the National and Provincial Parks Association of Canada (NPPAC)-created the Coalition For Wilderness. The next day, Jim Keenan, director of Ontario's parks division, reported that his staff had "produced a philosophical rationale for wilderness parks, " and had studied site selection criteria and management. 57 This news encouraged the preservationists, but their time to influence the ministry's plans was already running short.
The relationship between the CFW and park planners was immediately established in a private meeting. Keenan and planning supervisor Tom Lee were "generally enthusiastic" that the coalition would "support their efforts to obtain wilderness parks." Opposition within the ministry came from two groups: timber and mines officials who objected to "tying up" land; and foresters, who disagreed with proposed management guidelines. The coalition's most significant contribution might "be helping to create the right political climate" to "force these two groups of the civil service to modify their views." This kind of relationship had several precedents in North American parks and forestry planning.
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Membership and Activities W hat did the CFW accomplish and who did the work? The anticipated financial and personnel support failed to materialize. Charter groups lent their names but, despite initial enthusiasm, they were unable or unwilling to devote their resources to the CFW.
This frustrating lack of support 59 was a product of the movement's diversity, the variety of environmental issues before the public, difficult economic times, and pressure group dynamics. Each Ontario wilderness group had its own preferred style of advocacy, organizational structure, and blend of policy interests.
60 When Addison and Bates canvassed this community, each response reflected the group's priorities and resources. Lack of material support did not necessarily mean a lack of sympathy. For example, the FON often endorsed new initiatives, but then delegated the work. The groups supported park system planning, but some (the FON, NPPAC, and CNF) were too busy with other environmental issues. 62 Environmental groups suffered from inflation and stagnant or declining membership. The CFW also encountered fundraising difficulties due to its legal status. Because the coalition was not a charitable organization, it could not issue tax receipts to donors.
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Ideological and tactical differences explain some reluctance to offer supportand the tenacious hold on leadership by Addison and Bates. Within the FON, for example, a contest emerged over the wilderness idea. Author Wayland "Buster" Drew challenged the proposed focus on parks, as a way of preserving wilderness.
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But the most fundamental difference was over the role of science. Years later, Addison recalled that he and Bates:
would have happily turned leadership over to others in Toronto who were closer to the action, but for one thing. The others were busy justifying wilderness primarily on recreational, historic and other grounds. We were determined to keep the natural (intrinsic) [scientific] values first and foremost. That is the only reason we tried to maintain our leadership. We would have concentrated on using our scientific expertise and left the leading to others if all in the coalition had agreed the so-called intrinsic priorities were the most important and, in fact, as important as the others combined. 65 There is considerable irony in this insistence upon "natural" scientific values, as the primary justification for wilderness protection. It was a key reason for building the CFW, but it also undermined the coalition from the beginning because the groups invited to join the coalition did not share this "science first" perspective. It might seem that Addison and Bates committed a tactical error when they tried to build a coalition by drawing together groups whose justification for wilderness was fundamentally different from their own-or at least less committed to scientific values as a case for protecting wilderness. They recognized the political risk, but took their chances because they needed the broad political support of a coalition to succeed in their goal of influ- encing government policy. During the mid-twentieth century, a similar conflict raged in the United States over the justification for wilderness protection. An older recreational emphasis on masculine self-reliance and living off the land clashed with the emerging wilderness ideal of an "untouched" biological reserve. According to historian James Morton Turner, the resulting compromise was minimal impact camping: the "leave no trace" recreational ethic of the late twentieth century. It differed from the earlier woodcraft movement in its dual embrace of consumerism and environmentalism, while leaving behind "the social ideals around which the wilderness movement first coalesced." 66 In Ontario, the recreational proponents also won out when they downplayed the CFW's scientific rationale for preservation as politically ineffective, and instead emphasized recreational, aesthetic, and historic values. The notion of a biological reserve for scientific purposes-a genetic repository-remained the backbone of a parallel network of nature reserves, managed under the provincial park system.
The coalition had other limitations, suffered by all Canadian pressure groups. The high cost of communications and transportation-in the days before email and the internet-presented an enormous obstacle for CFW. Even a basic meeting in Toronto involved considerable travel costs for the Thunder Bay advocates. Thus, they limited their travel, and the frequency of meetings and newsletters. 67 Another common difficulty was the "free rider" problem. 68 Sympathetic people in the charter groups may have preferred to leave the difficult planning work to either the CFW leaders or the government. Finally, perhaps southern Ontario preservationists were alienated by the northerners' regional base, or their social profile as well-connected, well-educated, articulate and uncompromising? For various reasons, the member organizations failed to produce either the funding or the volunteers necessary to implement the coalition's grand scheme.
After its formation as a pressure group in April 1973, the CFW matured rapidly, engaging in three major activities. First, the coalition met regularly with government representatives, exchanging information with civil servants and politicians. Although the preservationists and park planners were in "close agreement, " 69 the bureaucrats favoured a smaller minimum size for wilderness 66 A second major thrust of the CFW was its attempt to complete a wilderness parks system plan. The task was simply beyond its resources. 72 This failure affected the coalition's third important activity-publication. With Litteljohn's assistance, Addison and Bates wrote "Wilderness in Ontario" (1974), the capstone of their work.
73 (Figures 17 and 18 ) A deceptively simple-looking document, printed on stock paper with an illustrated cover, it proposed a system of fifteen wilderness parks, each at least 750 square miles in size, for a total of 23,000 square miles. The report was not the elaborate blueprint initially envisioned; rather, it recommended how the government should design its own plan. In January 1974 two hundred copies were circulated to MLAs and other influential people. The FON also published an abridged, serialized version in Ontario Naturalist. 74 Such modest publicity was far less effective than originally planned, but it did educate and inspire a select public. With the completion of its report, the coalition began to crumble in the spring of 1974. The leadership suffered from "burnout, " commonly experienced by teachers and 75 The "pressure of three jobs" forced Addison to resign temporarily in May; Litteljohn also reduced his commitments for health and family; Bates stepped down to pursue post-graduate work in Calgary. Addison and Bates periodically resurfaced in wilderness management seminars, and to write position papers. See files from 1974-78 in AP. 76 The wilderness blueprint blended recreational demand studies, Angus Hills' landscape classification-identifying thirteen forest "site regions" subdivided "into sixty-five districts, on the basis of land forms containing distinctive combinations of physiographic and biotic conditions"-Paul Maycock's vegetative habitat site classification, and other data. Killan ness park system plan was overly ambitious, given the complexity and enormity of the task.
Conclusion
T he history of the CFW must be seen in the wider context of environmental politics during the 1970s. Its success lay in identifying and occupying specific tactical, ideological, and policy niches. Its failure was also a product of the diversity of environmentalism. Systems planning lacked the popular appeal of other environmental issues, like earlier, single-park campaigns. Faced with weak support, the CFW leaders acted like others in the advocacy community and simply directed the "group" on their own. Indeed, Bill Addison and David Bates were the coalition for much of its life. 77 Like other contemporary groups, the CFW adopted tactics designed to exploit its strengths. Addison and Bates rejected the open confrontation practiced by the AWL, and employed the pre-1968 traditional approach of quiet diplomacy to place emphasis on their scientific knowledge and reasoned proposals. The CFW's close relationship with scientific and technical personnel was similar to the "loose but reinforcing connection" in the United States between citizen reformers and ecological scientists. Passage of the National Forest Management Act (1976) encouraged American citizens to establish local groups and get involved in planning, using "the latest in ecological science."
78 Although Addison and Bates were both teachers, doing preservationist work in their spare time, they were much more than "radical amateurs, " to use Stephen Fox's phrase. 79 They had impressive credentials-formal training, and first-hand knowledge of the wilderness. Their work was a continuation of the Pimlott pattern: wilderness advocacy by professionally-trained people. 80 The coalition exemplified successful environmental groups by occupying a specific ideological niche within the advocacy community. For strategic and personal reasons, Addison and Bates downplayed the "wilderness for recreation" argument and upheld the scientific rationale, as the FON had some forty years earlier, but with an updated understanding of ecology. Here, the preservationists met the limits of their influence. Both the government and the wider advocacy community regarded scientific arguments as less politically potent than recreational or aesthetic reasons. Thus, the provincial policy adopted for the wilderness parks system-described in MNR's "Blue Book" (1978)-aimed to preserve "representative undisturbed natural landscapes, " but rededicated the government to the primacy of wilderness recreation. 81 While the CFW marked a change in the "wilderness for science" argument, it also represented continuity. Previous generations of Canadians had also sought to use wilderness resources. As in the past, the coalition (and the MNR) depended on large technical systems, grounded in some measure of control, conquest, and centralization, albeit for different purposes. One striking irony was the attempt by preservationists to impose a system upon wilderness-something widely regarded as the antithesis of human organization. 82 Addison and Bates either overlooked or dismissed this irony, in their urgency to protect the wilderness for what they regarded as altruistic motives. The coalition's wilderness ideal, like others before, was a cultural construct based on the natural ecosystem concept, shaped by personal experience, changing scientific views in the United States and Canada, and political considerations.
This study demonstrates that pressure group dynamics can reveal important nuances about environmental politics. Studies of influential elites-even disguised as groups-can provide insights about how scientific knowledge is generated, communicated, and applied in environmental policy. 83 How many other coalitions like the CFW were essentially sounding boards for their leadership? What interests and scientific authority did pressure groups represent when they advocated positions on complicated environmental issues? Their contemporary opponents were wary of such questions because they knew they were in a battle for public opinion. 84 By digging below the surface of environmental coalitions, historians can identify the interests and values those organizations promoted in the politics of science.
Seen in this wider context, the Coalition For Wilderness contributes to a growing body of case studies in which scientific knowledge was contested in the shaping of Canadian environmental policy. Other examples include the Great Lakes fisheries, Ontario forest regeneration, managing the impacts of acid rain, harvesting the Pacific rain forest, and fighting the spruce budworm. Scientists competed with entrenched economic and political interests (sometimes publicly, sometimes within bureaucracies), to gain the upper hand in shaping policy. 85 In the case of Ontario's Great Lakes fisheries, "scientists had an effective impact… by redefining their objectives." Before the 1970s, they "viewed fisheries management as primarily a technical problem"-maximizing harvests. Fisheries scientists helped transform management during the following decade "by demonstrating that a variety of stresses-fishing, eutrophication, exotic species-affected fish stocks." Effective management "could not focus on one stress or one species to the exclusion of all others." Instead, scientists embraced a more comprehensive powilderness advocacy in ontario litical and economic process of proactive, strategic planning to "acknowledge the complex ecology of fish stocks." Other forces "helped ensure a favorable political climate:" public "recognition of a crisis, " rising "concerns about environmental quality, " recreationists' demands, and the "contemporary interest in strategic planning." 86 The CFW episode shares some similarities with the Ontario fisheries case but offers a slightly different pattern. In the case of wilderness, two scientifically-trained private citizens (rather than professional, largely university-based scientists) shared ideas with and offered political support to government-employed planners who synthesized the science. Like the fisheries scientists, the CFW and government planners redefined their objectives, embracing a wider ecological perspective than before in creating and managing wilderness parks.
Postscript: New Coalitions P erhaps the most significant legacy of this episode was the idea of a coalition: it became the successful modus operandi of the Ontario wilderness movement. Addison , 2000) ; Epp, "Ontario Forests and Forest Policy;" Munton, "Fumes, Forests, and Further Studies;" Rajala, Clearcutting the Pacific Rainforest; Sandberg and Clancy, "Politics, Science, and the Spruce Budworm." Munton's thesis that science was ignored or used to delay a policy response to acid rain in Ontario is similar to Jennifer Read's finding that science had an ambiguous impact on policy makers dealing with the typhoid crisis; see "'A Sort of Destiny': the Multi-Jurisdictional Response to Sewage Pollution in the Great Lakes, 1900-1930, " Scientia Canadensis 22:3 (1998-9), 103-29. 86 Bocking, "Fishing the Inland Seas, " quotes on 64, 66-7.
